noble-secp256k1

secp256k1, an elliptic curve that could be used for assymetric encryption, ECDH key agreement protocol and ECDSA signature scheme.

Algorithmically resistant to timing attacks.

This library belongs to noble crypto

noble-crypto — high-security, easily auditable set of contained cryptographic libraries and tools.

Usage

npm install noble-secp256k1

import * as secp256k1 from "noble-secp256k1";

// You can also pass BigInt:
// const PRIVATE_KEY = 0xa665a45920422f9d417e4867efn;
const PRIVATE_KEY = Uint8Array.from([
  0xa6, 0x65, 0xa4, 0x59, 0x20, 0x42, 0x2f,
  0x9d, 0x41, 0x7e, 0x48, 0x67, 0xef
]);
const MESSAGE_HASH = "9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31";

const publicKey = secp256k1.getPublicKey(PRIVATE_KEY);
const signature = secp256k1.sign(MESSAGE_HASH, PRIVATE_KEY);
const isMessageSigned = secp256k1.verify(signature, MESSAGE_HASH, publicKey);

API

getPublicKey(privateKey)
function getPublicKey(privateKey: Uint8Array, isCompressed?: false): Uint8Array;
function getPublicKey(privateKey: string, isCompressed?: false): string;
function getPublicKey(privateKey: bigint): Uint8Array;

privateKey will be used to generate public key. Public key is generated by doing scalar multiplication of a base Point(x, y) by a fixed integer. The result is another Point(x, y) which we will by default encode to hex Uint8Array. isCompressed (default is false) determines whether the output should contain y coordinate of the point.

To get Point instance, use Point.fromPrivateKey(privateKey).

getSharedSecret(privateKeyA, publicKeyB)
function getSharedSecret(privateKeyA: Uint8Array | string | bigint, publicKeyB: string | Uint8Array | Point): Uint8Array;

Computes ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) shared secret between a private key and a different public key.

To get Point instance, use Point.fromHex(publicKeyB).multiply(privateKeyA).

sign(hash, privateKey)
function sign(hash: Uint8Array, privateKey: Uint8Array | bigint, opts?: Options): Uint8Array;
function sign(hash: string, privateKey: string | bigint, opts?: Options): string;
  • hash: Uint8Array | string - message hash which would be signed
  • privateKey: Uint8Array | string | bigint - private key which will sign the hash
  • options?: Options - optional object related to signature value and format
  • options?.k: number | bigint - random seed. Default is one from crypto.getRandomValues(). Must be cryptographically secure, which means Math.random() won’t work.
  • options?.recovered: boolean - determines whether the recovered bit should be included in the result. In this case, the result would be an array of two items.
  • options?.canonical: boolean - determines whether a signature s should be sorted by half prime order
  • Returns DER encoded ECDSA signature, as hex uint8a / string and recovered bit if options.recovered == true.
verify(signature, hash)
function verify(signature: Uint8Array | string | SignResult, hash: Uint8Array | string): boolean
  • signature: Uint8Array | string | { r: bigint, s: bigint } - object returned by the sign function
  • hash: string | Uint8Array - message hash that needs to be verified
  • publicKey: string | Point - e.g. that was generated from privateKey by getPublicKey
  • Returns boolean: true if signature == hash; otherwise false
recoverPublicKey(hash, signature, recovery)
function recoverPublicKey(hash: Hex, signature: Signature, recovery: number | bigint): Point | undefined
  • hash: Uint8Array | string - message hash which would be signed
  • signature: Uint8Array | string | { r: bigint, s: bigint } - object returned by the sign function
  • recovery: number | bigint - recovery bit returned by sign with recovered option Public key is generated by doing scalar multiplication of a base Point(x, y) by a fixed integer. The result is another Point(x, y) which we will by default encode to hex Uint8Array. If signature is invalid - function will return undefined as result.

Point methods

Helpers
// 𝔽p
secp256k1.P // 2 ^ 256 - 2 ^ 32 - 977

// Prime order
secp256k1.PRIME_ORDER // 2 ^ 256 - 432420386565659656852420866394968145599

// Base point
secp256k1.BASE_POINT // new secp256k1.Point(x, y) where
// x = 55066263022277343669578718895168534326250603453777594175500187360389116729240n
// y = 32670510020758816978083085130507043184471273380659243275938904335757337482424n;

// Elliptic curve point
secp256k1.Point {
  constructor(x: bigint, y: bigint);
  // Compressed elliptic curve point representation
  static fromHex(hex: Uint8Array | string);
  static fromPrivateKey(privateKey: Uint8Array | string | number | bigint);
  static fromSignature(
    hash: Hex,
    signature: Signature,
    recovery: number | bigint
  ): Point | undefined {
  toHex(): string;
  add(other: Point): Point;
  // Constant-time scalar multiplication.
  multiply(scalar: bigint | Uint8Array): Point;
}
secp256k1.SignResult {
  constructor(r: bigint, s: bigint);
  // DER encoded ECDSA signature
  static fromHex(hex: Uint8Array | string);
  toHex()
}

There is an option to have 2x speed-up by precomputing powers of two. Use generate-precomputes script & include the result in index.ts.

Security

Noble is production-ready & secure. Our goal is to have it audited by a good security expert.

We’re using built-in JS BigInt, which is “unsuitable for use in cryptography” as per official spec. This means that the lib is potentially vulnerable to timing attacks. But:

  1. JIT-compiler and Garbage Collector make “constant time” extremely hard to achieve in a scripting language.
  2. Which means any other JS library doesn’t use constant-time bigints. Including bn.js or anything else. Even statically typed Rust, a language without GC, makes it harder to achieve constant-time for some cases.
  3. If your goal is absolute security, don’t use any JS lib — including bindings to native ones. Use low-level libraries & languages.
  4. We however consider infrastructure attacks like rogue NPM modules very important; that’s why it’s crucial to minimize the amount of 3rd-party dependencies & native bindings. If your app uses 500 dependencies, any dep could get hacked and you’ll be downloading rootkits with every npm install. Our goal is to minimize this attack vector.
  5. We’ve hardened implementation of koblitz curve multiplication to be algorithmically timing-resistant.

License

MIT (c) Paul Miller (https://paulmillr.com), see LICENSE file.